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INTERVIEW

THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Ronald J. Gilson*
Cheryl L. Conner:** Where do you think corporate governance
is headed in the United States?
Gilson: In a number of directions at the same time. To see this,
keep in mind that a corporation's governance structure is composed of the group of decision makers who determine corporate
policy, the incentives that influence their behavior, and the
feedback and monitoring structures which evaluate corporate
performance and cause future adjustments in strategy and
implementation. The structure is animated by three different
mechanisms: the operation of the market-the force of competition in the product or service markets in which the corporation
operates; the legal framework-the formal rules of conduct
established by governing statutes and their corresponding enforcement techniques; and shareholder direct action-the use by
shareholders of the electoral process. Each of these mechanisms
is best suited to different circumstances and can be expected to
be the primary response to different kinds of problems. Thus,
there is not a model of corporate governance in which one size
fits all.

* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University and
Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University.
** Third-year law school student, University of Richmond School of Law and
Managing Editor, Richmond Journal of Law and Technology.
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For example, the governance model that we observe in high
technology companies is radically different from the model we
observe in more traditional segments of the economy, and my
guess is that in some ways they are moving in different directions.
The single most effective governance mechanism is market
competition. Rather than the intermittent operation of control
contests or proxy fights, product market competition operates
continuously to evaluate the corporation's performance and
penalize lapses in execution. In many high technology markets,
if poor performance lasts long enough that more formal governance mechanisms can be invoked, it will already be too late.
The corporation will have missed a generation of technology, or
the industry standard will already have been established. The
traditional techniques of governance are going to play a less
significant role in these circumstances.
In contrast, more traditional formal governance mechanisms
will play a primary role where product market competition is
less effective. In an oligopolistic setting like the automobile
industry, General Motors could continue to perform abysmally
for years before the board of directors finally acted to alter the
corporation's course. In terms of speed of invocation, the control
market sits somewhere between product and formal governance
mechanisms, capable of acting with great speed once initiated,
but still operative only after a substantial value gap has
emerged.
With respect to these more traditional areas, I expect we will
continue to watch a tension play out between, on the one hand,
a judicial attitude which seems inclined to give directors more
discretion in fending off capital market monitoring and, on the
other, the efforts by institutional shareholders to impose discipline on the board's behavior. The tension will be played out
through disputes over the rules governing proxy contests, and it
will continue to be played out through disputes over the rules
governing defensive tactics, and, in particular, the poison pill.
Unfortunately, it seems the Delaware courts are moving in the
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wrong direction, favoring less efficient, more slow moving governance mechanisms, like proxy fights, over speedier mechanisms
like takeovers.1
Conner: Looking at the institutional investors, you seem to
agree with the concerns about whether they are actually successful in reforming corporate governance.2 Do you also agree
with the analysis that they are not really representing all
shareholders, but just institutional investors like themselves?
Gilson: The argument that institutional investors do not represent small shareholders has always struck me as nonsense. In
my experience, the argument is typically invoked by those
threatened by effective shareholder oversight-either corporate
managers who are the object of governance oversight or plaintiff class action lawyers who resist displacement by institutional
investors acting as "lead" plaintiffs pursuant to recent federal
securities law reform.3 Institutional investors are simply acting
for small holders. Mutual funds and pension funds are acting
as fiduciaries for individual investors who channel their savings
into the capital market through intermediaries. It is an extremely sensible investment strategy. I have never understood
why the intermediaries' interests are different from those of
their investors. In the end, it seems to be a one sentence slogan, an exercise in rhetorical flourish, not analysis.
Conner: If small shareholders do not feel that they are being
represented, what is the possibility they could implement some
of the minimalistic programs, such as "Just Vote No" or "Just
Don't Vote"?4
Gilson: I think that the likelihood is basically zero. Most individual shareholders, quite sensibly, don't read the material presented to them; they simply own too little stock to warrant the

1. See, e.g., Unitrin Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
2. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Krackman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 868-76 (1991).
3. For an example of the argument, see Melvyn L Weiss, What the Contract
with America Means for Securities Lawyers: 'Common Sense Legal Reform,' 907 PLI
CoRP. 285, 305 (1995) (observing that large investors have different interests from
"average investors").
4. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No or Just Don't Vote: Minimalist Strategies For Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 729 PLI CoRP. 827
(1991).
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time and energy involved. The advantage of institutions is less
that their incentives are always perfectly aligned with their
investors, than that they can capture the economics of scale
possible with respect to monitoring management. In most major
corporations, institutions own a majority of the stock. So, if
their attention is attracted, you can actually accomplish something. Small shareholders, in contrast, face a massive collective
action problem. Who do we imagine is going to organize and
pay for their effort?
Conner: Do you feel that this is a problem resulting from the
proxy rules or just a lack of incentive on the part of the shareholders?
Gilson: I really do not feel that there is a problem with the
proxy rules as they apply to small investors. Because of the
expense of organizing small shareholders into a ten or twelve
percent block, little would change in this respect even if the
proxy rules were eliminated entirely. The Securities and Exchange Commission acted wisely in amending the proxy rules to
reduce barriers to collective action by institutional shareholders
in the electoral environment. The next step would be to extend
the initiative into the control market by loosening the circumstance when aggregation is required under § 13(d) of the Williams Act.'
Conner: If you had the power to make one change in corporate
governance, what would that change be?
Gilson: In the end, I think the place to start is where the Delaware Supreme Court lost its way in declining to follow Chancellor Allen's roadmap in Interco' of the allocation of power between shareholders and managers.7 The Chancellor explained
quite eloquently that the ultimate decision about whether to
sell the company belongs to the shareholders. If the Delaware
Supreme Court could get that allocation straight, the rest

5. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d) (1994).
6. City Capital Assoc., Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A-2d 787 (Del. Ch.
1988), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
7. See, e.g., Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989) (affirming the court of chancery's decision allowing a target corporation's board to act

contrary to the wishes of the shareholders where the court was satisfied that the
directors were acting in the long term interests of the corporation).
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should take care of itself. For example, the balance between
friendly and unfriendly offers begins to move back to friendly
because there is little to be gained by dragging things out.8
The uncertainty that is associated with ITT screwing around for
seven months9 disappears and transactions take place based
upon their underlying merits, and not upon lawyers' court room
histrionics. It is crazy that the outcomes of the largest business
transactions in history are being decided in courtrooms in
Wilmington or in Reno. These are issues for the market, not for
judges.
Conner: Do you feel that the laws are uncertain in this area or
that the courts are simply stepping in where they do not belong?
Gilson: Corporate law is constitutional law. The statute creates
a skeleton, to which the courts add flesh. Thus, the bulk of
corporate law appropriately is judge-made. The courts need to
clearly delineate the allocation of decision making, as did Chancellor Allen, and then stay out of the way.
Conner: In light of the developments in the last few years, how
relevant is the Japanese model of corporate governance to the
American model?
Gilson: I think the Japanese model, putting aside for a moment
what we actually mean by that," has a great deal of rele-

8. See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981).

9. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 25, 1997 that Hilton Hotels
filed proxy material with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), asking shareholders to approve Hilton's hostile takeover of ITT. See Hilton Hotels Files ITT Proxy

Material, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1997, at AS. The IT shareholders did not vote on
the Hilton plan until seven months later. See Christina Binkley, 127 Holders' Vote is
Defeat for Hilton, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at A3. To be sure, the auction fiT
ultimately conducted generated a significantly higher price than originally offered by
Hilton, but bear in mind that the auction took place only because the courts blocked
fIT's efforts to defeat the Hilton offer. The auction could have been conducted
months before.

10. The Japanese model is an interlocking structure of process-oriented technology, lifetime employment for core workers, cross shareholdings, and a bank-centered
capital market. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, J. ECON. LIT., Mar. 1990, at 1. (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993) [hereinafter Gilson & Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu]; Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employ-
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vance. That is, one of the interesting things about the Japanese
governance system is how the governance system is shaped by
the nature of production on the shop floor. The fit between lean
manufacturing techniques and the governance system is very
persuasive. That does not mean that we have to match the
Japanese governance system in order to undertake lean manufacturing, but we do have to recognize that governance is not
just a slip-cover that fits over any production process. Governance has to mesh with the nature of the underlying production
process. For me, the fit between governance and production is
the Japanese model's most important lesson.
Conner: Are we moving toward this kind of model?
Gilson: Well, I think we can already see how governance mechanisms adapt to the character of production. High technology
companies have a very different governance structure than
companies in more mature industries. Companies that have
gone through a leveraged buyout retain a characteristic governance structure even after they have sold stock to the public.'
You are beginning to see an increasingly different governance
process on the part of some of the older industrial companies as
their boards of directors become reenergized. What you are
getting is a greater range of governance processes that reflect
the different contexts in which these companies operate. That
seems to be a very good thing-governance and production are
simultaneously determined.
Conner: In an article you wrote with Professor Mark Roe about
understanding the Japanese system, 2 you mentioned that the
best candidate for the Japanese-type strategies are the high
technology areas. However, these are also the areas that need
the least reform. Do you still see the possibility of using these
techniques in heavy industries, such as automobile and steel? 3
Gilson: We have begun to see that the relationship between the

ment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance (1998) (Columbia University Working Paper) [hereinafter Gilson & Roe, Lifetime Employment].
11. See generally Steven Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J.
FIN. ECON. 287 (1991).
12. See Gilson & Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu, supra note 10, at
882.
13. See id. at 883.
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automobile industry and its suppliers has changed dramatically
over the last seven or eight years in the direction of Japanese
lean production processes. Also, simultaneously we have seen a
more active board involvement, parallel to Aoki's punctuated
main bank monitoring in Japan.'4 So I think that you are beginning to see this, but shaped differently. We have not moved
to a Japanese governance model. Rather, our governance model
has been sufficiently adaptable to accommodate lean production.
Conner: Are strategies used in Silicon Valley and the automobile industry generally applicable to all industries, or can they
only be applied in such discrete circumstances?
Gilson: It is a continuum. The critical point is simply that there
are a much larger number of templates than anyone ever
thought. Where you end up along this continuum is going to
depend upon the local characteristics of the industry. It is going
to be very hard to sit at a great distance and make broad statements about the way corporate governance should be. Analysis
has to be increasingly textured and tailored to the particular
circumstances of an industry.
Conner: You have done much work in developing a political and
economic model of corporate governance. How well do you think
that model applies to multi-national corporations in a global
economy?
Gilson: I do not believe in multi-national corporations in a
governance sense; I just don't think I have ever seen one. To be
sure, I have seen national corporations that do business internationally, but I cannot think of a corporation whose governance I would consider multi-national. For example, co-determination, a central feature of German corporate governance, applies only to give German workers a role in the corporation's
governance structure, even if a majority of the employees of a
German corporation's employees are outside Germany. Thus, I
think the multi-national characterization refers to the markets
in which a corporation does business, not to its governance

14. See Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey
and Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE
STRENGTH 11 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994).
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structure.
Conner: There is a paradox today on the corporate scene. On
the one hand, firms are loosening their ties to employees. On
the other hand, new products and processes depend on a welltrained and committed labor force. What role can corporate
governance play in resolving that paradox?
Gilson: It's not obvious to me that it is a paradox. Thoughtful
observers like AnnaLee Saxenian have argued that the genius
of Silicon Valley is the fact that everybody changes jobs all the
time. 5 So that, in her view, there is some decrease, I suppose,
in loyalty to the corporation, but it is made up for by the benefits of knowledge spill-overs.
More generally though, the issue with respect to investing in
human capital depends, in large measure, on whether you are
talking about general human capital or firm-specific human
capital. It is certainly the case that, if employees view their
tenure as less certain, there is less incentive to invest in firmspecific human capital. But as Mark Roe and I have considered
in the Japanese context, the puzzle is the extent to which there
is really very much firm-specific human capital, as compared to,
for example, industry-specific human capital." How long would
it take a Toyota worker to actually learn the ropes at Honda?
My speculation is not very long because they are industry-specific skills and if the skills are industry-specific skills, the worker retains an incentive to acquire them because, if he learns
them, his market value increases even if he moves to a different company in the industry. The extent to which the skills are
firm- or industry-specific is an empirical question the answer to
which too often has simply been assumed because it makes the
model work.
The second issue is the accuracy of the generalization that
firms are loosening their ties to employees. This is true in some
industries. However, in the high tech industries, the problem is
just the opposite. Companies are trying to work out ways to
keep their employees. Generalizing across industries is very

15. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
16. See Gilson & Roe, Lifetime Employment, supra note 10.
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difficult, and the result is that it makes some of the popular
reporting on the problem at least a little misleading.
Conner: In light of the layoffs due to corporate restructuring
and the fact that employees increasingly face the possibility
that they will be laid off, is the problem that their loyalties are
to the firm? Is that something that employees need to readjust,
dedicating themselves, instead, to their industry?
Gilson: The story in Silicon Valley is that people work for the
Valley; they do not work for a firm. Their future is not tied to
a particular firm, but to the industry. The incentive for skill
acquisition is the same, but it no longer depends on the
employee's belief that she will spend her entire career at a
single firm.
The other point is that the data I have seen strongly suggests that blue-collar employment did not go down in the layoffs associated with reorganizations in the 80s. Although there
is significant variance in the distribution, on average blue-collar
employment was not reduced by these transactions. However,
white-collar employment-middle management-got hit pretty
hard.' Much of the political debate seems to turn on particular anecdotes, like Susan Faludi's Wall Street Journal story of
KKR's acquisition of Safeway. 8 The data thus suggests that
the mean outcome of the LBO phenomenon was favorable-more efficiency without reducing blue collar employment-but there was a lot of variance. The way you deal with a
desirable mean outcome but high variance is to provide transition payments to those who bear the brunt of the variance, not
to block a process which, on balance, seems to lead toward
greater efficiency.
Conner:
In light of this, is there a lesson in the recent UPS
19
strike?

17. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Laid-Off Bosses Scramble in a Changing World,
N.Y. TIIES, July 12, 1992, at Al; Liz Mullin, Jobless Find an Outlet for Frustration,
L.A. Bus., J. Jan. 7, 1991, at 25 (noting that blue-collar jobs can often be found within a week, while white-collar positions often take three to six months); Stephen S.
Roach, The New Majority: White-Collar Joblessness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at A3.
18. See Susan C. Faludi, The Reckoning: Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits But Exacts A Heavy Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1990, at Al.
19. See generally UPS Customers Look for Alternatives, LA TIMEs, July 31, 1997,
at Dll.
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Gilson: The UPS strike presents quite a puzzle. I am not entirely sure that I know what the strike was about. The settlement seemed to increase the number of permanent jobs, at the
cost of a loss in of the total number of jobs. I am not sure that
I understand who was benefited by the outcome.
The newspaper accounts seemed to suggest that a major
issue in the strike was the solvency of the multi-employers'
pension fund in which UPS participated. Apparently, UPS was
the most solvent company in the unit and, as a result, would
be on the line for the liabilities of other employers to Teamster
members (but not UPS employees) if the other employers failed.
UPS was said to have wanted primarily to get out from under
the contingent liability and the union felt most strongly about
protecting the solvency of the fund, even though it did not affect UPS workers. If this is accurate, it is hard to see what the
UPS workers got from the strike. They would have been better
off trading increased benefits for themselves in return for a
decrease in UPS' subsidy of other companies' employees. 0
The first question is: what was the fight really about? Publicity about fighting over a pension plan doesn't sell newspapers.
The second question is: what was the net effect on employment? The existence of any effect is, to me, at least questionable, but that is an empirical question. The final question is:
how much did it cost the union to keep the current pension
plan? Whatever that figure it was a transfer from the UPS
workers to non-UPS workers who were employed by other employers in the plan who were less solvent. Now that may have
been a wonderful thing for workers in general, but the subsidy
ran from the people who went on strike.
Conner: Do you see another element, whereby the leadership of
the union saw an opportunity, and an issue that would help
them entrench themselves as union leaders?
Gilson: We don't have to use the term "entrench;" let's call it
"union democracy." The people who elect Mr. Carey"' are not
limited to the UPS workers. The electorate obviously includes

20. See The Teamsters' Hollow Victory, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A18.

21. Ron Carey is the current General President of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Union.
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the employees of the less solvent participants in the multi-em-

ployer pension plan. From the perspective of the entire electorate, the trade-off may have been quite sensible. However, we
should not lose sight of the fact that it was, in effect, a tax on
the UPS workers.
Conner: In your Allen Chair lecture, you focused on the impor-

tant role of venture capital in our economy and the importance
of stock markets to venture capital. In your view is there an-

other country on the horizon which is capable in the intermediate future of duplicating this financing approach, Silicon Valleytype technology, and the resulting financial successes?
Gilson: Great Britain and Israel have done quite well in this
area, although both have stock market-centered economies.
Another round of new small capitalization stock markets have
been organized in Germany and France. It will be interesting to
see how they do. Even if these efforts are no more successful
than the prior round, European companies can make use of
NASDAQ, thereby piggy-backing off of our differently structured
capital market.
Conner: Are there any lessons so far in their development that
the U.S. system can learn from? Are there any things that they
did right, that we did wrong?
Gilson: On the high-tech side, I think that the answer is no. In
general, however, there are a large number of things they do
better. We have no vocational training. The U.S. industry could
absorb a zillion machine tool operators if we had some way to
train them. In contrast, the Germans do an exceptional job of
vocational education. There are wonderful, high-paying jobs to
be had, but we're not training people for them.
There is an enormous growth in the attention being paid to
comparative corporate law, and to issues like comparative training. It remains to be seen whether it attracts any political
interest. Corporate governance can't affect schools, even though
the quality of vocation training dramatically affects corporate
performance and competitiveness. That debate is in the political
arena.
Conner: Do you see any potential that the politicians will take
note of what the thinkers in this country have already noticed?
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Do you see real potential that we will take advantage of the
lessons learned in other countries?
Gilson: Boy, I would like to be really optimistic, but few people
have given the issue proper attention. There are a couple of
people in Congress who have made it an agenda. One is Congressman Tom Campbell who represents Silicon Valley and may
be the smartest person in Congress. Hopefully, the Republicans
will put him on a committee soon. Tom is articulate and smart.
He has a Ph.D. in Economics from Chicago, a Harvard law
degree, and is on the law faculty at Stanford. He represents a
district that cares a great deal about investment in human
capital. We'll have to see if the Republican leadership listens to
him.
Conner: Do you see any of these countries who are doing things
right possibly accelerating its technological and corporate development in such a way as to get ahead of the U.S. in the reasonably short term?
Gilson: In the very short term it is hard to see any place that
is capable of developing an innovative technology sector that
will rival the U.S.
Conner: And in the next twenty or thirty years?
Gilson: In that length of time, all outcomes are up in the air.
Conner: Do you see China or Russia as possibilities?
Gilson: It is entirely possible. They both have the potential for
extremely hard working and extremely well-trained workforces.
But you are also asking for a prediction about reform of the
political system, the development of stable property rights, and
the overall stability of the societies: what the strategists call
"political risk." As to this, I don't have a clue.
Conner: The companies in Silicon Valley tend not to enforce
non-compete provisions ...
Gilson. They cannot enforce them.
Conner: Yes, because of California law.
Gilson: Correct.
Conner: They do not enforce non-compete provisions against
their departing employees despite the high mobility of the
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workforce there. Also, they often do not apply for patents. In
your view, is this an ideological expression of their commitment
to the free flow of information? Because there is evidence of the
existence of agreements that employers can use to get around
the laws disallowing non-compete provisions.
Gilson: It is hard to do effectively, and you are not going to
scare off venture capital very much by rattling the litigation
sword. On the patent issue, you do see a pattern of cross-licensing, where companies basically believe that, in the end, they
are better off having access to everybody's technology, than
trying to monopolize their own. I don't think that is ideological.
It is driven by what is in their own best interests. They tried
like crazy to enforce them; they just failed. The serendipity was
that, because of a nineteenth century peculiarity in California
law, failing was the best thing that ever happened to them.
Conner: Success was forced upon them?
Gilson: Yes. I don't think it was conscious.
Conner: What do you think of the recent wave of telecommunications consolidations?
Gilson: I cannot make heads or tails out of it. More generally,
these transactions are driven by beliefs about real economic value. There are people who genuinely believe putting different
combinations of assets under one roof generates real economies.
Sometimes people are right, and sometimes they turn out not to
be right. Time-Warner believed in something called a "media
conglomerate." It turns out that there really hasn't been any
special value in having a movie company own a magazine or a
record company; in the phrase "media conglomerate," the critical word turned out to be conglomerate. In the telecommunications transactions, people are betting on their perception both of
future technology and of the way markets are going to develop.
I am going to enjoy sitting back and watching, but I don't have
an independent view on whose bets look best.
Conner: Do you think that part of the issue is the fact that
modern technology requires larger and larger investments, and
larger companies are more capable of staying on top technologically?
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Gilson: That assumes some fairly massive inefficiency in the
capital markets. You have to tell the story that internal financing is better than external financing. And you can begin to tell
some stories where that makes sense. But again, it is not obvious to me that scale alone is driving the phenomenon, particularly if the acquirers are paying for the acquisitions with their
own stock. If they can finance an acquisition with their own
stock, they can finance internal growth with their own stock. At
least for now, I am agnostic.
Conner: You have noted some doubts about success. Are there
any potentially serious problems that could result from these
consolidations?
Gilson: When acquisitions turn out badly, people lose their jobs.
Bob Allen forced AT&T to buy NCR. AT&T loses ten billion
dollars and Allen loses his job.' It took too long, but it happened. People make internal investments. IBM invests more
internally every year than the entire venture capital industry's
annual disbursements. It is easier to observe venture capital
because it takes place on the outside, but people are making
the same kinds of investments on the inside. They are high
risk investments; sometimes they lose. You are making technology bets; you are making a bet on consumer preferences. They
are risky investments.

22. See Tom Lowry, Superstars Who Lost Their Luster: CEOs Find Fame, Fortune
Fickle, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 1995, at lB.

